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Abstract: Rejecting notions of inherent violence, this article focuses upon the large 
numbers of Algerians from the French organised anti-FLN Militias who were subjected 
to reprisals after the French exit from Algeria in 1962.  Estimates of those killed range 
from 10,000 to 150,000, and the violence is justifiably described as brutal.  The 
specificity of this violence has only emerged as a field of enquiry since the 1980s. 
Initially this stemmed from the impact of eyewitness accounts, combined with the 
emergence of organised pressure groups in France.  Collectively these new voices spoke 
out against simplistic interpretations that reduced these Militias to pro-French villains in 
a heroic decolonisation narrative - a perspective reinforced by the recent historical 
research of Pierre Daum, François-Xavier Hautreux, Mohand Hamoumou and Michel 
Roux.  This article draws upon this historiography, but it also moves beyond it to situate 
Algeria within a global history of violence and to challenge interpretations that explain 
this violence solely in terms of a Franco-Algerian dynamic.  Instead, the 1962 
massacres must be understood in terms of broader global processes of violence that 
connect these generic contexts to the specificity of the Algerian case.      
Keywords: Algeria, Harkis, Decolonisation, Violence, Emotions       
 
The French military archives provide graphic accounts of the violence conducted 
against the harkis by vengeful Algerian nationalists of the FLN during 1962. “The ex-harkis 
are subjected to diverse torture and bullying in front of the civilian population”, comments an 
intelligence report of 18 August:  
Everyone had the right to come and strike them, insult them or spit in their faces.  The 
FLN members forced them to cover their faces in excrement.  In the day, they are forced 
to do hard work, or stand in groups under the sun with nothing to drink…the ‘suspects’ 
are crammed into cells full of human excrement.  The women, heads shaved beforehand, 
are shut away separately in identical conditions.1    
The same report goes on to outline how, on 9 July in Aïn Mellouk, three former French Muslim 
Military Auxiliaries were dragged behind a lorry in front of the population until they died; and 
in Merouana (in Sud-Constantinois), at the end of July, 40 former auxiliaries were forced tear 
up grass with their teeth; while in Bouthamama and in Taberdga (Khenchela region) several 
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were bound hand and foot and dragged behind horses until they died.2  In July in the Aurès 
Mountains at M’chouneche, a captain in the auxiliary forces had his eyes gouged out before 
being castrated and then dragged before the local population for ten days until he died.3  This 
was retribution carried out against Muslim Militias in the wake of Algerian independence in 
July 1962.  By any measure these were acts of extreme bloodshed: the aim was not death in 
itself, but death by protracted physical humiliation.  Through symbolic violence, the 
perpetrators wanted to mark these Muslims out as traitors who had no place in the new nation 
state.   
It can become tempting to interpret this violence in pathological, a-historical terms: the 
result of an Algerian mind-set that is inherently attuned to bloodshed.   It can become tempting, 
too, to see this retribution simply as the result of a uniquely violent Franco-Algerian dynamic.   
This article contests such interpretations.  It aims instead to situate the Algerian case within a 
global history of violence and to challenge explanations of violence that rest solely in the 
dynamic of Franco-Algerian relations, while offering a historically grounded framework for 
understanding violence that studiously avoids prejudice.  It is a response to Laleh Khalilli’s 
call, published in November 2013, for a scholarly conversation that challenges a hysterical 
mainstream narrative which ‘locates the sources of violence in or emanating from the region 
in Islam(ism) or attributes it to some half-baked but remarkably persistent cultural explanations 
(tribalism, ancient hatreds, cycles of violence, etc) which uncomfortably echo the racism of an 
earlier scholarly era.’4  Specifically, she argued, this analysis must understand ‘the political 
and sociological processes and relations that produce violence, the form violence takes, the 
embedding (or dis-embedding) of violence in law and procedure, and the after-effects of 
violence.5  It must also encompass the strategic choices of oppositional movements (guerrilla 
warfare, violent revolutionary action, anticolonial warfare) as well as the violence wielded by 
states and empires (war, policing, incarceration, torture).  Equally, she continued, it must 
challenge hackneyed myths by bringing the region into conversation with those working on 
other geographical areas such as, she underlined, Allen Feldman on conflict in Northern Ireland; 
Katherine Verdery’s ethnography of the politics of dead bodies in Eastern Europe; and Veena 
Das’s work on gendering of violence in India.6    
Any consideration of violence in the Middle East and North Africa must also engage 
with the insights of Helen Graham’s history of the Spanish Civil War.  Graham views this 
struggle as part of a wider European pattern of violence between 1936 and 1947 - one that was 
defined by a war of intimate enemies and local massacres where civilians were killed by their 
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own compatriots. In explaining the endemic violence in the Spanish Civil War, she warns 
against de-historicized categories that see Spain as ‘violent and southern.’ 7  Such de-
contextualisation, she continues, is fatal for the historian because it can lead to ‘a mesmerising 
focus on the acts of lethal violence themselves which fail singularly to place in their proper 
historical context either the motives or the forms of violence.8  Instead, the Spanish Civil War 
must be seen as a pivotal episode in Europe’s ‘dark twentieth century’: 
that is, in the story of how, not so long ago, the mass killing of civilians became the 
brutal medium through which European societies came to terms with structure 
shattering forms of change.9       
Graham’s approach is richly suggestive for historians working on the Middle East and North 
Africa because it shows how violence in any area must be located in much broader patterns of 
cause and effect.     
Similarly, Donald Bloxham and Robert Gerwarth’s recent work on political violence in 
Europe highlights the need to guard against the “socio-cultural fatalism” that portrays some 
areas (e.g. the Balkans and the Caucasus) as inherently more violent than others (e.g. 
Scandinavia).10  The contributors to the Bloxham and Gerwarth volume also challenge the 
conventional chronology of global violence.  They reject the notion, advanced with typically 
compelling verve by Eric Hobsbawm, of an intensely murderous phase lasting from 1914 to 
1945, that is preceded by a long and relatively stable nineteenth century, and then followed by 
post-1945 peace (itself initially conditioned by the long economic boom from 1944 to 1974).11  
In contrast, the revisionism of Bloxham and Gerwarth views 1914 to 1945 not as a sudden 
eruption, but in terms of practices that began in last part of the nineteenth century – during 
what they term “the long twentieth century.”  Nor, they continue, is there a sudden turn away 
from violence at the end of the Second World War.  Indeed, the continuation of these violent 
practices shaped the wars of decolonisation from 1945 into the 1970s.    
In the violence conducted against pro-French Algerians after the exit of the French from 
Algeria in 1962 it is estimated that reprisal killings accounted for between 10,000 and 150,000 
deaths, and the incredibly brutality of the murders is widely attested.  This violence only 
emerged as a specific field of enquiry from the 1980s, initially stemming from the impact of 
eyewitness accounts, such as Un Enfant dans la Guerre by Said Ferdi, combined with the 
emergence of organised pressure groups in France.12  Collectively, these new voices spoke out 
against simplistic interpretations of this violence.  For them it was wrong to reduce these 
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Algerians to villains in a heroic decolonisation narrative - a perspective further amplified in the 
recent historical research of Pierre Daum, Mohand Hamoumou, François-Xavier Hautreux, 
Michel Roux and whose work seeks to understand these Algerians in terms of complexity and 
nuance.13         This article draws upon this historiography, but also presents a new analytical 
framework by situating Algeria within a global history of violence.  It represents a change of 
perspective - one attentive to the danger of explaining this violence solely in terms of a Franco-
Algerian dynamic.  Instead, the 1962 massacres must be understood in terms of broader global 
processes of violence that connect these generic contexts to the specificity of the Algerian 
example.  
 
The article is divided into four parts.  The first part examines who were these Muslim 
Militias at the cease fire in March 1962 and how they were recruited as part of a counter-
insurgency strategy.  The second part focuses on the period 1959-1962 when, as the Algerian 
war entered a protracted endgame, the fate of these Muslims became a contentious issue within 
the transition process.  It will also outline when and where the massacres took place.  Part three 
then examines the factors that shaped the reprisal violence of 1962, looking beyond the 
specifics of rural Algeria to identify motivations and influences.  The conclusion then employs 
recent work on emotional history to explore the emotional context that framed this violence.14  
 
Who were the harkis? 
On 19 March 1962, a ceasefire came into effect that opened the way to Algerian 
independence. 15   After a long drawn out negotiation process, the Algerian conflict was 
seemingly at an end; one of the bloodiest episodes in the decolonisation process that had begun 
on 1 November 1954 with a series of attacks by the then unknown National Liberation Front 
(FLN).  Twenty four hours later, Le Monde calculated the number of Algerians still in the 
French army, police and civil service as 263,000 out of a population of nine million.16  This 
was composed of 20,000 professional soldiers, 40,000 conscripts, 20,000 with the Special 
Administrative Sections (Section Administrative Spécialisée, SAS) units, 15,000 police, 60,000 
within self-defence villages, 50,000 civil servants and 58,000 Muslim military auxiliaries, 
known as harkis derived from the Arabic word for movement.17   Collectively harkis became 
the blanket term for all pro-French Algerians, flattening out differences even though in 1962 
there was a huge variation according to class, gender and geographical location.   
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The same day the Armed Forces Minister, Pierre Messmer, outlined how these ‘French 
Muslims’ in the army would be treated.18  Under these provisions professional soldiers could 
continue to serve or leave with a pension.  Conscripts could stay with their units or be integrated 
into the transitional local police force under the control of the Provisional Executive.  While 
the Muslim auxiliaries could be demobilised, join the transitional local police force or be 
absorbed into the Aid Centres.  Within the peace accords themselves, although there was no 
specific clause referring to the ‘French Muslims’, article two had explicitly forbidden any 
recourse to ‘collective and individual violence’: a principle of ‘non-reprisals which had been 
accepted by the Provisional Government during the secret talks in November 1961.19   In this 
manner the accords recognised that independence was taking place within the context of the 
United Nations Charter on Human Rights.20        
Algeria was on brink of independence.  Yet, originally these recruits had been engaged 
as part of a counter-insurgency strategy to win and keep Algeria French or at least arrive at a 
pro-French solution and here the key promise had been that Algeria would never be handed 
over to the FLN.  However, this was about to happen; an outcome that left these Algerians 
feeling terribly vulnerable.   
The harki units were part of a long-standing tradition of Muslim recruitment into the 
French administration, army and police that were a key aspect of colonial rule, in particular in 
the remote areas of rural Algeria.21   They were also part of a colonial military strategy that 
stretched back to invasion of Algeria in 1830 when the army recruited local units and 
established Arab Bureaux, run by officers who spoke Arabic and Berber, to administer local 
justice and win the population over to the French cause.22  This strategy became part of the 
military mind set during imperial expansion but was crucial in Morocco in the 1920s and 1930s 
when the army brought the countryside under central authority through a combination of the 
stick and the carrot.  Repression went hand in hand with and the establishment of governing 
structures where Native Affairs Units, led by French officers with expertise in local languages 
and customs, sought to build lasting bridges with the population.23  This Moroccan experience 
in turn framed the Indochina War 1946 to 1954.   Now, however, counter-insurgency strategy 
was further refined by the Cold War as, confronted with communist insurgents, officers soaked 
up Mao’s theories on guerrilla warfare, in particular his conclusion that, to win, insurgents must 
move amongst the population like fish in water.24    Specifically, they fashioned a response 
whose pillars were the separation of the population from insurgents and the recruitment of local 
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allies: two ideas crucial in a war that was seen to be about winning ‘hearts and minds’ rather 
than just holding territory.25    
The French lost in Indochina in 1954 and left Morocco in 1956, but the lessons from 
both theatres were applied to Algeria from November 1954 onwards.  Importantly the military 
and political thinking was one and the same.  This was because French leaders constantly talked 
about winning over the Muslim population through a third way solution that, by rejecting 
Algerian nationalism and settler extremism, would create a Franco-Muslim community based 
upon equal rights.  Such thought defined policy throughout the Fourth Republic and into the 
Fifth whereby the fight against the FLN was a two-pronged affair that combined reform 
(political empowerment as well as efforts to overcome poverty, illiteracy and unemployment) 
and repression.  In both respects Algerian participation was seen to be a measure of imminent 
victory.26    
Turning FLN prisoners against the FLN was a particularly important part of this 
strategy because their retractions, distributed as tracts amongst the population, were used to 
demoralise the FLN.  This 1959 testimony, for example, called upon FLN fighters to face facts 
and accept de Gaulle’s promise of a truce, drawing upon a shared emotion experience of the 
liberation struggle: 
 My very dear brothers, 
It is soon five years that our country endures an implacable and murderous   
struggle…I have lived amongst you, I have shared your suffering and misery, your 
anguish and your grief…It would be criminal on my part not to warn you and share 
the feelings that I have.  General de Gaulle has given his honour to respect the brave 
ones amongst you and welcome them with open arms and in all dignity.27         
Beyond this propaganda aspect, turning FLN prisoners had another military goal.  French 
offices knew that their inside knowledge was a precious weapon, so some prisoners were 
recruited into harki units or used to infiltrate the FLN.28    In part these prisoners were turned 
by the power of argument.  They were convinced of the sincerity of French promises or at least 
the futility of armed struggle.  But there was also manipulation.  As prisoners they were in a 
weak position and French officers ruthlessly exploited this power relationship.      In the case 
of the thirteen year old Saïd Ferdi he was captured by the French in 1959.29  He was then given 
a choice: either work for the French army or his father would be tortured.  Thereafter he was 
locked into a terrible logic.  He understood that he had to fight because if he was captured by 
the FLN, he would be executed as a traitor.    
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Saïd Ferdi was indicative of a much larger truth: how counter-insurgency strategy fed 
off the vulnerability of Algerian society in the mid to late 1950s.  Extreme poverty, allied to 
the fact that by 1959 two million Algerians had been relocated into camps, meant that a 
dependency culture was endemic.30   In this context the French army knew that the promise of 
food and money could recruit allies in the first instance.    
The FLN activist and historian Mohammed Harbi has underlined the complexity of 
harki history.  He first grasped this complexity when imprisoned after the June 1965 military 
coup.31  Many fellow prisoners were harkis and talking to them he began to understand that it 
was wrong to think just in terms of a black-and-white story of resistance and collaboration, 
framed by the memory of the French Occupation.  He realised that there were large grey 
zones of behaviour which explained why some original FLN members could end up in the 
harki ranks.  These ambiguities had been effaced by the power of the national liberation 
narrative of ‘one and half million martyrs’ at independence.  Indeed, writing in 2003, Harbi 
was adamant that these ambiguities, challenging easy divisions of heroes and villains, went to 
the heart of a new analysis of the Algerian War.32   However, it must be underlined that this 
type of understanding, itself a product of Harbi’s long historical reflection, is the exception 
rather than the rule as regards wider Algerian society.  The strength of the resistance narrative 
means that at the level of daily lexicon the harki remains the ultimate hate figure and the 
ultimate political insult.   
 
Clearly some Algerians were motivated by an identification with France.  Bachaga 
Boualam was a prominent landowner and head of the Beni Boudouane tribe from the Ouarsenis 
Mountains in the north-west Algeria, an area where nationalism was weakest. Rising to become 
the Vice-President of the French National Assembly at the end of the 1950s, he saw himself as 
French and rejected the FLN as a tool of communism that threatened landowners like himself.   
Moreover, he used his prestige as a regional leader to win over his tribe to the French cause. 
Through meetings he convinced the local peasantry that they would profit from a French 
victory, thereby ensuring that membership of the Beni Boudouane became synonymous with a 
pro-French position.33   
For many more rural Algerians much lower down the social scale joining the harkis 
was a way out of crushing poverty through the provision of a regular income.  Often, given the 
high levels of illiteracy, these recruits had little clear idea what exactly they were enlisting for.  
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Dalia Kerchouche, for example, explains how in 1956 her 29 year-old father, needing to feed 
three small children, joined the local police in the Ouarsenis region where, as has just been 
noted, the FLN was weak.34  Immediately he was posted to Kabylia where the FLN was strong 
and in the ensuing months he came to gradually realise that he was not involved in police work 
but full scale warfare where his unit was being used to isolate the civilians from the FLN.   
In many cases harki recruitment was about physical survival – it was a way of securing 
protection from French Army exactions as well as using the French Army to shield them from 
FLN violence that aimed to control the Muslim population.  This last dimension, understanding 
harki recruitment as a reaction to FLN ruthlessness, is a very strong aspect of harki memoirs 
and testimonies.35  But it was also recognised by Mohammed Harbi in his ground breaking 
analysis of the interior politics of the FLN, published in 1980.  For him the striking increase in 
harki numbers in 1957 was in part because FLN violence drove Algerians into the arms of the 
French army.36  Again in 2003 he admitted that he FLN strategy on the ground was politically 
unsophisticated and brutal, alienating many pro-independence Algerians who began to fear the 
FLN methods.37  As one harki remembered:   
You get up one morning and you discover that your neighbour has had his throat cut 
during the night.  You, you know him, your neighbour for a long time.  You do not 
understand why he has been killed.  You understand only that you must not ask 
questions…So, in the beginning, you say yourself to reassure you: ‘It is astonishing but 
the moudjahidin know undoubtedly what they are doing.  The men killed were perhaps 
playing a double game.’  And then after a while, with all these deaths, the old people, 
the youngsters fifteen or sixteen years old, you say to yourself there is something not 
right here, that tomorrow it could be your turn, like that, for nothing.38   
On another level of complexity, some recruits became involved in a double-game.  Gaining 
French confidence gave them greater freedom to aid the FLN food, financial support, 
information.  This was because the FLN and the harkis were not two separate spheres.  In some 
cases they did have relatives in the FLN and this resulted in covert support.  This nether world 
is difficult to quantify although Michel Roux has calculated that about forty per cent of recruits 
were involved in aiding the FLN in some way and certainly some French army officers 
misgivings about reliability.39  This is why, even if desertions until late 1961 desertions were 
strikingly small, just 3000, the harkis were employed on a monthly contract because if they 
were thought to be colluding with the FLN they could be simply laid off.  In 1959 in Thiers in 
south Kabylia, for example, 200 out of a unit of 450 not renewed because suspected that 
working with the FLN.      
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Finally, it is important to underline the large variations in personal engagement.  Some 
harkis were highly committed.  This was the case of the Commando Georges counter-
insurgency unit, as well the units that were used in anti-FLN repression in Paris in 1961.40 
Others, though, were in harki units only for a few months, weeks or days even.  In many case 
this momentary engagement was the product of complicated micro-histories as individuals 
navigated the complex, constantly evolving, and highly dangerous local politics of rural 
Algeria.  
  
The massacres  
In May 1958 a political crisis brought on by the Algerian War led to the collapse of the 
Fourth Republic and the return to power of Charles de Gaulle.  Initially de Gaulle continued 
with the Fourth Republic policy of reform.   Thus, during the elective process that established 
the Fifth Republic much was made of Muslim representation, both in terms of the large scale 
election of Muslim deputies and the fact that Algerian women voted for the first time.  Then, 
on 3 October 1958, de Gaulle unveiled an ambitious investment programme for Algeria which 
was combined with a conciliatory call on the FLN to lay down their weapons.41   
When this last tactic failed de Gaulle gave the army carte blanche to destroy the FLN 
militarily through a renewed offensive in 1959.  In preparation General Challe, the brains 
behind the operation, raised fresh harki units.  De Gaulle expressed misgivings about their 
effectiveness, but Challe was insistent.  In his opinion they had a key role.  Militarily they 
would provide knowledge of the local terrain, while symbolically they would demonstrate that 
parts of the Algerian community were opposed to the FLN.     
However, for de Gaulle this offensive, which in military terms reduced the FLN in 
Algeria to a skeleton, was not about keeping French Algeria.  It was about allowing him to find 
a solution from a position of military strength and on 16 September 1959 he gave a televised 
speech which outlined three solutions: independence, complete integration or some form of 
association between the two countries where government by Algerians would be back up by 
close French cooperation.42  Clearly his preferred scenario was the last one, but in the following 
year this scenario was overtaken by events.   Above all huge nationalist demonstrations in 
Algeria in December 1960 convinced de Gaulle that there was no alternative to negotiations 
with the FLN.  Algeria had now entered the end game, but many army officers were ashamed 
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at this prospect.   They saw it as a betrayal of promises made to the harkis which is why officers 
like Challe became embroiled in a failed coup against de Gaulle in April 1961.43   
Ironically this failure accelerated the path to independence and led to a collapse of harki 
morale.  Indeed, anticipating FLN victory many deserted to the FLN, especially when, as some 
harki units were disbanded at the end of 1961, it was clear that the French government wanted 
to prevent an influx of Muslim refugees.  In this tense context the 19 March 1962 cease-fire 
did not bring an end to the violence.  On the contrary there was an intensification as hard line 
settlers conducted a last ditch terror campaign against the FLN and the French Army.  In this 
chaos, compounded by the departure of one million settlers, the particularity of the harki 
massacres was difficult to immediately discern, especially since much of the violence took 
place in remote rural areas.  Only gradually did this violence take shape as news of the 
massacres filtered out through French politicians, journalists, campaigns by intellectuals and 
French Army intelligence.44 
In this respect the 1963 report to the French Minister of the Armed Forces, compiled 
by Brébisson, commander in chief of the French Army in Algeria in 1962, is a crucial source 
of information, along with civil servant’s report by Jean-Marie Robert in the area around Akbou 
in the upper Soummam River valley in Kabylia in Northern Algeria and the press reports by 
the Le Monde journalist Jean Lacouture. 45  Using these documents as a starting point it is 
possible to talk about four phases of violence, the first of which was from March-July 1962.  
This phase was characterised by isolated acts of reprisal.   The only collective massacre took 
place on 18 March at Saint Denis du Sig in the South West Oran region essentially because 
until the French surrendered formal sovereignty the French Army presence was still a deterrent 
to such massacres.  Overall there was a gathering atmosphere of violence as many harkis 
realised that they were in danger.   Here the response of one harki, Ahmed Kerchouche, was 
typical.  Shortly after the cease-fire he attended a meeting organised by the FLN for members 
of the Beni Boudouane tribe which, as has been noted, took a largely pro-French position.  The 
local FLN leader explained that the new state was willing to forgive but this stance, he 
underlined, was at variance with his own position of revenge:  
If it was up to me, you, the Beni Boudouane who rallied en masse to the settlers, 
I would kill you all.46 
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Kerchouche immediately concluded that whatever the promises of the future FLN state in 
reality the lives of him and his family were in danger.  He now made preparations to leave for 
France.  
This meant that the second phase began with independence on 5 July.  Now the harkis 
were truly exposed particularly because the movement of pro-French Algerians had been 
closely monitored by new Algerian government in waiting.  In Akbou, Jean-Marie Robert 
reported how initially the FLN message was conciliatory. 47  FLN tracts claimed that the past 
was forgotten.  He himself was assured by FLN representatives that Muslim administrators and 
politicians would not be harmed.48  Yet, he concluded, in many cases this was a ruse because 
in this area of rural Kabylia the massacres begin in earnest end of July.  At this point it was 
very much a movement from below, motivated by a surge in patriotic anger produced by 
independence..  There was no overall coordination.  Popular tribunals sprung up to enact local 
micro-histories of revenge where some were put into camps, some were executed en masse 
while others were subjected to systematic humiliation lasting several days.49  Significantly, 
with the French Army ordered not to intervene, some massacres were staged near French 
barracks: a symbol of new Algerian sovereignty. 
The violence was a reflection of the on-going chaos as the FLN imploded into a bitter 
battle for power between the Provisional Government and Ben Bella.  On this basis Ben Bella’s 
victory in September, bringing with it the prospect of stability, brought a temporary lull in the 
massacres.   However, they began again in November 1962, the third phase of the violence.  
The trigger was the eighth anniversary of the original FLN rebellion on 1 November 1954 
which provoked a renewed desire for revenge.  Now, though, this violence, more centrally 
controlled in nature, was driven forward by the incoming army of the frontiers.  Having built 
up its strength in Morocco and Tunisia, this was the spine of the embryonic Algerian state 
which, through the public punishment of traitors, wanted to assert general control over the 
Algerian population.  This phase petered out by early 1963 and seemed to be finally closed in 
June when Ben Bella declared that the harkis were forgiven in an interview with the French 
paper, Le Figaro.50       
This opened the way to the final phase: an uneasy peace that lasted until the mid-1960s.  
Momentarily, the violence could flare up, as in Souk-Ahras on the Tunisia border in January 
1964.  There were also some reprisals in France but overall there was a sharp decline in the 
violence and in 1965 20,000 harkis were released.51  During this period too discrimination on 
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the basis of anti-national behaviour was enshrined in the law while property of those deemed 
to have taken a pro-French position was confiscated.  However, in contrast to France after 
World War Two, this was the limit of legal punishment.   Revenge never translated into major 
trials, although this was partly because the major figures escaped to France.   
This violence had a strong class and gender character.  Most of the victims were from 
the poor, largely illiterate, rural peasantry and male who had served in harki units, although a 
minority were a more privileged strata of administrators and local politicians who were being 
punished for benefitting from the push for great equality and more Muslim representation since 
1956.52  A small number women were targeted but here rather than murder violence generally 
took the form of sexual humiliation such as rape, head shaving or, in the case of those from the 
local elite forced marriages with men of lower social standing.  Arriving at the numbers killed 
is difficult, however.  One French Army report dated 13 August 1962 put the figure killed in 
hundreds and identified the violence as being particularly concentrated in the east and south of 
Algiers. 53  But it also recognised this calculation was speculative, firstly because the FLN was 
covering up these killings, and secondly because they were being carried out in remoter rural 
areas where there were few French troops and it was difficult to get precise intelligence.54    
Jean-Marie Robert talked about 1,000 to 2,000 victims in his arrondissement.  Yet, this was 
only one area and it is difficult to extrapolate from this example, although, with 72 
arrondissements in Algeria, pro-harki groups have then put the figure at between 72,000 and 
144,000, even rising to 150,000.55  Jean Lacouture in Le Monde on 12 November 1962 gave a 
figure of 10,000 killed between 19 March and 1 November 1962.56   
Ever since there has been a problem of calculating violence, largely because the figures 
have become ideological, bound up with political struggles pursued by harki community 
groups in France.57  In contrast, amongst professional historians Benjamin Stora has cited 
10,000 to 25,000, Gilbert Meynier has estimated 30,000, while Mohand Hamoumou has talked 
of 150,000.58   What is easier to quantify is the number who escaped to France.  Although de 
Gaulle was hostile to a mass influx of harkis, the government did put in place makeshift 
reception camps to receive those most at risk before which was estimated at 10,500.59  Crucially 
too large numbers arrived in France via clandestine networks established by French Army 
officers.  Most were made to reapply for French citizenship and according to subsequent French 
census figures between 1962 and 1968 140,000 Muslims made such applications which 
included 80,000 former harkis and their families with the rest made up of for the most part of 
civil servants, politicians and military personnel.60   
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Algeria 1962 
How do we understand of the character and extent of Algeria’s violence in 1962?   On 
the French side the drivers were state power combined with nationalism, imperialism and a 
chaotic end of empire scenario.   Seen in these terms the anti-harki violence was the result of a 
long colonial violence deployed by the state that was intensified by the fact that Algeria was 
an integral part of the Republic as well as the eight year duration of the Algerian War, one of 
the longest and bloodiest episodes in the decolonisation process.61   The French state felt 
threatened both in terms of nation-state sovereignty and global imperial interests.  This is why 
it deployed huge violence that led to the death of 141,000 Algerians in an asymmetrical war 
where the two sides were ill matched in terms of resources.62    Critically, within this counter-
insurgency war the harkis played a key part especially during the 1959 offensive that 
effectively brought the interior FLN to its knees.  Yet, military success did not correspond to 
political victory because this counter-insurgency violence alienated the majority of the 
Algerian population.  For this reason independence produced an intense desire for revenge, 
magnified by the manner in which some harki units had gained a reputation for human rights 
abuses.   It was what the FLN journalist and theoretician Frantz Fanon called mirror violence: 
a response to original colonial violence.63  But although some retribution was directed towards 
the departing settlers, most concentrated upon the harkis.  They became the objects of mirror 
violence par excellence because, left behind by the French state, they were the easiest targets 
for retribution.      
As such the massacres were the product of an end of empire scenario that was utterly 
chaotic.  The coordinated exit envisaged by the French-FLN Accords was quickly swept aside 
and the ensuing anarchy meant that imagined revenge could be translated into actual revenge.   
Algeria was an uncontrolled space during the summer of 1962 which became the cover for 
settling of accounts in the remote mountainous regions to the south of the capitol and eastern 
part of the country as the French army underlined on 13 August 1962:    
This repression…takes a form of extreme violence, going from degrading bullying to 
summary executions and torture.  One can only confirm that these exactions are ordered 
by the wilaya commanders, but all is happening as if the FLN is profiting from the 
present period of anarchy in order to carry out against Algerians who served for France 
a purge which it leaves the responsibility to the lower echelons.64    
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Allied to this de Gaulle was adamant that the harkis were not the same as the settlers.  For him 
they were not French and had to remain in Algeria: an uncompromising stance that formed a 
key context for the massacres.  This perspective stemmed from his adherence to cultural 
separatism, articulated in private in March 1959 to Alain Peyrefitte, a young Gaullist deputy 
and close political advisor.  He privately confided that he could not see how France could 
absorb 10 million Muslims who would become 20 million and then 40 million because France 
would no longer be France that ‘a European people of a white race, Greek and Latin culture 
and Christian religion’.65  It also stemmed from the fact that de Gaulle did not see the harkis as 
a coherent group, discounting in a government meeting on 3 April 1962 as ‘a magma which 
had served no purpose, and which it was necessary to get rid of without delay’.66   
This prejudice had a clear class complexion.  For de Gaulle only those who he saw as 
having successfully assimilated, such as the politician Bachaga Boualam, could be accepted in.  
However, the majority could not be because they were Algerian who would find it impossible 
to adapt to French culture and would represent an economic burden.  There was the suspicion 
too that some harkis might be sympathetic to settler terrorism that was threatening the French 
state, while at the same time the French government did not want to jeopardise future relations 
with the Algerian state by allowing in potential opponents to that state.  As a consequence little 
was done for rural peasantry who bore the brunt of the violence.  Even when knowledge of the 
massacres became impossible of the French government to deny by August 1962, the 
authorities set out strict guidelines stipulating that the French units could not actively search 
out threatened harkis.  They had to wait until the harkis came to the barracks themselves and 
then they had to carefully screened.67   
On the FLN side, violence was shaped by a mixture of nationalism and state-making, 
coloured by a war culture as well as a belief in the purification of society.    Right from the 
outset all these elements were at the centre FLN strategy.  Within the ‘1 November 1954 
Declaration’ violence was not a political lever.68  It was how national liberation was going to 
be achieved.  Algerians had a national duty to mobilise behind the FLN in a peoples’ war and 
those who did not would be treated as traitors to be liquidated.  Within this framework FLN 
militants became obsessed with the idea that the greatest danger was pro-French Algerians; a 
fear that was fuelled by the uncertain conditions of clandestine warfare that made rumour rife 
and produced constant purges of supposed collaborators.          
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This violent, polarised nationalism was shaped by models of French nationalism and 
French revolutionary culture, both in terms of a peoples’ war of patriots versus enemies and 
the desire for a centrally controlled nation-state.  It was derived more recently from the 
examples anti-colonial nationalism of the Irish War of Independence, seen like Algeria to be 
national struggle to recover land and religious identity, and the Vietnamese struggle against the 
French in the Indochina War.  At the same time it drew upon a deep seated rural millenarianism 
which envisaged the end of French colonialism in terms of a climatic violent act.69   The role 
of the FLN, therefore, was not mass action.  It was about hardened, uncompromising, masculine 
vanguard that would set this millenarianism alight through terrorism.    
That said at certain moments FLN documents could be conciliatory.  In autumn 1959 
slogans to be diffused as graffiti or on tracts claimed that there was a place for the harkis in the 
National Liberation Army (ALN): ‘the colonialists despise you, the GPRA (The Algerian 
Provisional Government Republic) will restore to you dignity, Honour and liberty, join the 
ALN.’70    The same language was also aimed at Algerian conscripts in the French Army in a 
February 1960 tract: 
ALGERIAN: In the French army, you are suspected, watched, despised, in the ALN, 
you are with your brothers! Come…71   
But this language of conciliation, seeing the harkis and Algerian conscripts as victims of 
colonialism, was far outweighed by an unforgiving language of violence, based upon the 
conclusion that these groups had made the wrong political choices.  Repeatedly it was made 
clear that independence victory would lead to a violent reckoning as with this letter of 
intimidation to ‘Muslim counter-revolutionaries’ from 1956: 
Those who link their future to the moribund mechanism of colonialism are making a 
bad calculation.  Before classing you amongst those who have gone astray, we are 
offering you one more chance to retake the path of Honour.  Misfortune to those who 
stubbornly persist against our liberation movement.  Today or later or anywhere the 
judgement of the ALN tribunals will be carried out.  The traitors condemned to death 
will not escape the blows of our fedayeens (commandos).72    
Or the following tract from late 1957 calling on Algerians to desert from in the French army:  
ALGERIA WILL BE INDEPENDENT WITH OR WITHOUT YOU.  But we do not 
want you to be tarred with the shame of being a collaborator…ONE DAY IT WILL BE 
TOO LATE AND THEN IT WILL BE OH WELL FOR THOSE WHO DID NOT 
LISTEN TO THE VOICE OF TRUTH.73  
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In the Aurès Mountains in the south of the country on 9 January 1958 the following warning 
was left on the body of Algerian, left in full view contrary to Islam that calls for immediate 
burial: 
Here is the fate reserved to he who obeys or loves France.  Deserved to die.  He had no 
faith in our movement. He is not a Muslim.  With colonialism, he deserves to die like a 
dog.  He ignored the benefits of the ALN and we have cut his throat.  Pay the price…of 
betrayal, O dog!74     
Similarly a letter by Colonel Amirouche, commander of Wilaya 4, to a local harki leader dated 
15 November 1958 made clear the terrible consequences of his actions, not just for him but his 
children who will always be hated as ‘sons of a traitor.’75  He then posed the question: 
Will France take you?...She will well and truly abandon you, and you will be like a 
blind man in the middle of the desert, trying in vain to find your path.76   
Yet, as Algeria entered the endgame some FLN language was reconciliatory.  One 
directive by Ben Tobbal, the Interior Minister in the Provisional Government, from January 
1961 underlined the need to multiply contacts with the harkis and by ‘a work of persuasion’ 
bring them over to the ALN ranks.77  He was frank that many were ‘bastards’ but many too had 
become harkis through ‘weakness’ or ‘pressure from the enemy.’78   In the weeks following 
the cease-fire in March 1962 this sympathetic approach surfaced again.  One FLN document 
in Western Algeria in April stated that the harkis would not be harmed and considered just like 
any volunteer for the liberation struggle: 
O soldiers with the French army, you are today under the guardianship of France but 
your provisional Algerian government has signed an agreement with the French 
government which brings us peace.  They must be respected by the French forces and 
by us in accordance with national honour.79   
In contrast one FLN document dated 10 April 1962 left no doubt about the fate awaiting 
them.  It underlined how the FLN had to play a cunning double game, winning them over 
temporarily in order to eliminate them: 
Nobody ignores their shameful and criminal behaviour…If the Revolution has 
condemned them, the fact remains that the people will strike them and will always 
continue to reject them.  Nevertheless, the cease-fire is not peace, we will use tact and 
act with flexibility in order to win them over provisionally in order not to give them the 
opportunity to play the game of the enemy…Their final judgement will take place in a 
free and independent Algeria before God and the people will then be responsible for 
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fate…They will be written down on a black list which must be that must be kept 
thoroughly.80                  
Such language laid the ground for the massacres.  It drove the violence from below just after 
independence as well as that of November 1962, the third wave of anti-harki violence, when 
the massacres took on a new colour.   Now, through the coordinated action of the military and 
the police, it was about state violence from above.  It was about the organs of a state in making 
asserting control over the Algerian population through the elimination of a perceived internal 
fifth column.     
By the same token the massacres were the consequence of a specific FLN revolutionary 
war culture.  Encapsulated in the 1955 Algerian national anthem composed by the patriotic 
poet Zakariyya Mufdi, this war culture was built upon the concept of martyrdom: 
  On our heroes we will build a glory 
And on our bodies we will go up to immortality, 
On our hearts, we will build an army 
And of our hope we will raise the standard. 
Face of the Release, we lent oath to you 
And we swore to die so that Algeria lives 
 
Refrain: 
Testify! Testify! Testify!  
 
The cry of the fatherland assembles battle fields. 
Listen and answer it the call. 
Write it in the blood of the martyrs 
And dictate it with the future generations. 
We gave you the hand, O glory, 
And we swore to die so that Algeria lives 
 
Refrain: 
Testify! Testify! Testify!81  
 
By September 1959, as with the following slogan aimed at Algerian conscripts in the French 
Army, the FLN had given this blood sacrifice a precise number - of one million: ‘Algerian 
brothers, a million of your brother martyrs are watching you, they have died for you, honour 
their sacrifices and join the ALN.’82   Such imagery became the basis of a heroic resistance 
narrative that stigmatised the harkis as the enemy of the people and the ultimate hate figures.  
With the euphoria of independence this war narrative reached new heights: a muscular 
patriotism that stirred up calls for revenge in the name of the dead martyrs.  
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For this reason the anti-harki violence was conceived of in terms of particular 
purification model.  It was about cleansing the nation of traitors.   Furthermore, they had to be 
killed because of the future threat they posed to internal security; a sentiment intensified by 
paranoia about neo-colonialism, that is perceived French attempts to maintain their rule by both 
installing pro-French elements in power and limiting the power of the new Algerian nation 
state.   In this context another layer of complexity was the role of those harkis who deserted 
just before independence.   Painfully aware of how their own behaviour could lay them open 
to retribution, they had a vested interest in showing their loyalty to the incoming FLN and for 
some this was done by being at the forefront of revenge violence.   
In turn this purification model explains why the violence was symbolic.  It was not 
about military objectives.  It was about asserting national boundaries through protracted torture 
which is why the violence was neither detached nor technological.  This was intimate violence 
performed in front of a public.  This was violence which aimed at personal humiliation through 
bodily mutilation, in particular sexual humiliation through emasculation of men and the head 
shaving of women, as the 18 August 1962 French report cited at the beginning testified.  
Crucially, too, at no point was this revenge violence stopped and channelled into a legal process.  
There was no Algerian equivalent of the post-1944 trials of French collaborators.  Nor did anti-
harki violence endure as a state organised internment system.  Instead the violence petered out 
while the interned harkis were released by 1970.  What remained was a language of hate where 
to be called a harki was the ultimate political insult.   By contrast it was in France that large 
numbers of harkis became the basis of a camp system.  This is the striking specificity of the 
harki example: camp control by the former colonial power as they were placed in camps and 
organised into forest clearance schemes, in effect sealed off from mainstream French society 
through a continuation of colonial control.83 
Finally, and no less importantly, the anti-harki violence happened because there was 
little or no international reaction at the level of global organisations, other countries or the press.  
Partly this was because the particularity of the violence was lost within the generalised 
bloodshed that marked the end of French Algeria, but mainly it was because of geo-political 
calculations.   By 1962 there was generalised international support for Algerian independence, 
particularly in Africa and Asia but also amongst communist bloc and France’s allies, and in 
this context the massacres just did not register or were tolerated as a necessary evil.  In other 
words the violence was accepted because it was interpreted as internal violence that would 
bring about long term good on the world stage: the creation of a stable Algerian nation state.      
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Conclusion: Towards an emotional history of decolonisation 
An emotional history of the Algerian War is still to be written, although clearly personal 
and political emotions were at the crux of the conflict. This conclusion will point towards how 
such a history might be envisaged by opening up the question of the emotional economy that 
framed the Algerian violence of 1962.  In particular it will focus upon the concept of the 
‘emotional community’ - that is the understanding of the emotional states of other people, in 
order to situate the particular context for the massacres.84  
Clearly 1962 was a moment of enormous emotional crisis.   It represented the final 
failure of the ideal of a Franco-Muslim community idea that had been the basis of huge state 
violence in spring 1956.  At this point the Fourth Republic deployed some 400,000 troops in 
an operation that was justified not as a war, indeed the word war was withheld at an official 
level, but as an act of patriotic fraternity.  This counter-insurgency violence was about not about 
upholding the colonial status-quo.  It was driven by a sense of specific ‘emotional community.’ 
It was about protecting fellow citizens, French and Muslim alike, from a terrorist minority.   It 
was about reaching out to Muslims through large scale reforms that would result in a large 
scale emotional identification with France.  This is why the French Army invested so much 
effort in raising harki units. 
By 1961 De Gaulle had come to the conclusion that this Franco-Muslim community 
had failed.  For him it was clear that although some Algerians did identify with France, even 
to the extent of feeling to be fully French citizens, most empathised emotionally with Algerian 
nationalism.   In this context de Gaulle underlined the fact that his task as a political leader was 
to make decisions above emotion or romanticism.  Whether performing in cabinet or on 
television, he projected a particular type of political masculinity that encoded detachment, level 
headedness and realism.85  In contrast both to the Fourth Republic, which he derided as weak 
and divided, and to pro-French Algeria settlers, which he attacked as pursuing narrow interests, 
he conceptualised himself and the new Fifth Republic as strong, resolute and forward looking.  
Crucially he saw himself as speaking from an elevated position above the fray which allowed 
him to understand the higher interests of the French state and then communicate these interests 
through a series of direct television and radio addresses to the French people.  As such he 
conceptualised the end of French Algeria and decolonisation in general as a victory for 
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modernisation, the process by which France married the twentieth century, and therefore he 
saw the harkis as losers to be sacrificed.  In terms of ‘emotional community’ he did not see 
them as French and showed indifference to their plight, openly admitting that they would 
suffer.86  Indeed, in cabinet he ruthlessly exploited his personal political legitimacy to face 
down ministers over the issue in a cabinet meeting on 25 July 1962: 
We cannot agree to take all Muslims who come here declaring that they do not agree 
with the Algerian government.  The term repatriate obviously does not apply to 
Muslims; they are not returning to the land of their fathers.  In their case they would 
be refugees.87    
Ministers who disagreed did not continue the argument.  Intimidated by de Gaulle’s outburst, 
they bowed their heads in shame.  However, within sections of the army there was anger at de 
Gaulle’s abandonment.88  This led to disobedient clandestine action which, driven by notions 
of military honour, brought large numbers of harkis to France.  Likewise at the end of June 
French newspaper Combat published a public appeal to give political refuge to the harkis that 
called upon French people to write to parties and trade-unions demanding action.89   
This intellectual campaign failed to produce a large-scale emotional response because 
most French people followed de Gaulle’s logic.   By 1962 they just wanted an end to the 
Algerian War and the dominant mood was relief tempered by indifference and hostility to the 
partisans of French Algeria.  In the case of the settlers, this hostility was balanced by a sense 
that they were French and could ultimately be integrated.90  In contrast most saw the harkis as 
too different culturally and ethnically.  They did not see them as fellow citizens to be taken in 
or allies to be protected.  Rather, there was the suspicion that the harkis were sympathetic to 
settler terrorism and hence a potential internal threat to the unity of the nation: an emotional 
framework which, remembering the Liberation in 1944, also saw them as collaborators whose 
suffering was a consequence of the wrong political choices.  The massacres, therefore, were 
the result of a double purification process.  Both de Gaulle and the FLN wanted to cleanse the 
harkis from their respective nations.    
Returning to the revisionist approach to the history of political violence offered by 
Bloxham and Gerwarth,91 the Algerian case demonstrates the fallacy of attributing violent 
practices to socio-cultural determinants, while also illustrating the immense significance of 
wider global factors in shaping the motives and character of violent actions.  The Algerian 
example therefore fits within the context of other wars of decolonization from the post-1945 
period, all the product of a deeper history of imperialism, racism, and subjugation.   As Khalilli 
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reminds us,92 violence will never be fully understood unless it is freed from its localised 
obsessions and set in a broader comparative and global frame.    
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